Arbeitspapier

Emissions taxes and abatement regulation under uncertainty

We consider environmental regulation in a context where firms invest in abatement technology under conditions of uncertainty about subsequent abatement cost, but can subsequently adjust output in the light of true marginal abatement cost. Where an emission tax is the only available instrument, policy faces a trade-off between the incentive to invest in abatement technology and efficiency in subsequent output decisions. More efficient outcomes can be achieved through combined use of tax and mandated use of a given abatement technology or through combining the tax with an abatement technology investment subsidy. We compare the properties of the two potential supplements to the emissions tax.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4121

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Thema
externalities
Pigouvian taxes
subsidies
regulation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Christiansen, Vidar
Smith, Stephen
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Christiansen, Vidar
  • Smith, Stephen
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2013

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