Arbeitspapier

Stability and dynamics in an overlapping generations economy under flexible wage negotiation and capital accumulation

We analyze the stability and dynamics of an overlapping generations model under imperfectly competitive labour markets without population growth and with perfect foresight. Under right-to-manage wage bargaining we assume that wage is negotiated after the decision on the capital stock. With Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions the steady state is unique and the steady state capital stock depends on the trade union's bargaining power. This is because higher bargaining power of the trade union will induce workers to save more thus boosting the capital stock, ceteris paribus. Finally, we show that the steady state equilibrium is a saddle point.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1840

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koskela, Erkki
Puhakka, Mikko
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koskela, Erkki
  • Puhakka, Mikko
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2006

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