Arbeitspapier
Risk aversion and prudence in contests
I examine the impact of risk preferences on efforts and winning probabilities in generalised Tullock contests between two players. The theoretical analysis yields two main results. First, I specify a sufficient condition on the agents' comparative prudence under which a higher common level of risk aversion leads to lower aggregate effort in symmetric contests. Second, I show that for a certain range of parameters in asymmetric contests, higher risk-aversion will be a disadvantage if the agent is comparatively prudent.
- ISBN
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978-3-943153-39-2
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: BERG Working Paper Series ; No. 120
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Thema
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Tullock Contest
Risk Aversion
Prudence
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Sahm, Marco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
- (wo)
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Bamberg
- (wann)
-
2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Sahm, Marco
- Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
Entstanden
- 2017