Arbeitspapier
Information acquisition, signaling and learning in duopoly
We study firms' incentives to acquire private information in a setting where subsequent competition leads to firms' later signaling their private information to rivals. Due to signaling, equilibrium prices are distorted, and so while firms benefit from obtaining more precise private information, the value of information is reduced by the price distortion. Thus, compared with firms that do not attempt to manipulate rivals' beliefs, signaling firms acquire less precise information. An industry-wide trade-association acquiring information increases firm profit and may also increase consumer surplus, so allowing such collective action may be in the interest of regulatory authorities.
- ISBN
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978-3-86304-229-5
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 230
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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information acquisition
signaling
product differentiation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Liu, Ting
Wang, Tao
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (where)
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Düsseldorf
- (when)
-
2016
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Jeitschko, Thomas D.
- Liu, Ting
- Wang, Tao
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Time of origin
- 2016
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Duopoly in Space
Capacity choice and duopoly incentives for information sharing
Information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle
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Entry threat in Duopoly
Regulation of Duopoly Under Asymmetric Information: Prices VS Quantities