Arbeitspapier

Interconnection and prioritization

We analyze pricing and competition under paid prioritization within a model of interconnected internet service providers (ISPs), heterogeneous content providers (CPs) and heterogeneous consumers. We show that prioritization is welfare superior to a regime without prioritization (network neutrality) and yields higher incentives for investment in network capacities. As ISPs price discriminate between on-net and off-net CPs, their bottleneck property is propagated and competition for consumers increases resulting in a potential prisoner's dilemma when deciding whether to offer prioritization. We show that peering for prioritized traffic emerges as a collusive outcome and present off-net prices as a further collusive instrument.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1629

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
Thema
interconnection
investment
network neutrality
prioritization

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Baake, Pio
Sudaric, Slobodan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Baake, Pio
  • Sudaric, Slobodan
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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