Arbeitspapier
Two-part access pricing and imperfect competition
This paper considers a vertically separated industry with an upstream monopolist who supplies an essential input to two downstream Cournot firms. This situation is relevant to a number of sectors, including the telecommunications industry where trunk operators must have access to the local network of an incumbent firm to provide their long-distance service. The paper analyses two-part access pricing and input price discrimination under different regulatory settings, and it finds that discrimination may produce adverse welfare effects when it is practised by the unregulated upstream firm.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 34.1998
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
- Thema
-
Access pricing
Input price discrimination
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Valletti, Tommaso M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Valletti, Tommaso M.
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1998