Arbeitspapier

Two-part access pricing and imperfect competition

This paper considers a vertically separated industry with an upstream monopolist who supplies an essential input to two downstream Cournot firms. This situation is relevant to a number of sectors, including the telecommunications industry where trunk operators must have access to the local network of an incumbent firm to provide their long-distance service. The paper analyses two-part access pricing and input price discrimination under different regulatory settings, and it finds that discrimination may produce adverse welfare effects when it is practised by the unregulated upstream firm.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 34.1998

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
Thema
Access pricing
Input price discrimination

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Valletti, Tommaso M.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
1998

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Valletti, Tommaso M.
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 1998

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