Arbeitspapier

Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions

Through disaggregating public expenditures by economic functions this paper offers a new perspective on the existence and effectiveness of electorally motivated expenditure policy. The aim of the paper is to provide more detailed information on the specific expenditure categories by which politicians try to affect election results. Based on COFOG data for 32 OECD and Eastern European countries over the years 1990-2010, it is shown that political expenditure cycles in total expenditures as well as in specific expenditure categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, the paper also provides evidence that these electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the reelection probability.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper Series in Economics ; No. 275

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Thema
political expenditure cycle
political economy
re-election probability
COFOG

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Enkelmann, Sören
Leibrecht, Markus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
(wo)
Lüneburg
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Enkelmann, Sören
  • Leibrecht, Markus
  • Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Entstanden

  • 2013

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