Arbeitspapier
Superstars need Social Benefits: An Experiment on Network Formation
We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the presence of (social) benefits for incoming links. We find that social benefits are highly important. They facilitate convergence to equilibrium networks and enhance the stability and efficiency of the outcome. Moreover, in large groups social benefits encourage the formation of superstars: star networks in which the core contributes more than expected in the stage-game equilibrium. We show that this result is predicted by a repeated game equilibrium.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-112/I
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Public Goods
- Subject
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Network formation
networked public goods
peer production
social benefits
open source software
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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van Leeuwen, Boris
Offerman, Theo
Schram, Arthur
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- van Leeuwen, Boris
- Offerman, Theo
- Schram, Arthur
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2013