Arbeitspapier

Superstars need Social Benefits: An Experiment on Network Formation

We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior in a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the presence of (social) benefits for incoming links. We find that social benefits are highly important. They facilitate convergence to equilibrium networks and enhance the stability and efficiency of the outcome. Moreover, in large groups social benefits encourage the formation of superstars: star networks in which the core contributes more than expected in the stage-game equilibrium. We show that this result is predicted by a repeated game equilibrium.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-112/I

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
Public Goods
Subject
Network formation
networked public goods
peer production
social benefits
open source software

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
van Leeuwen, Boris
Offerman, Theo
Schram, Arthur
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • van Leeuwen, Boris
  • Offerman, Theo
  • Schram, Arthur
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2013

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