Science and teaching: Two-dimensional signalling in the academic job market

Arbeitspapier

Post-docs signal their ability to do science and teaching to get a tenure giving universities the possibility of separating highly talented agents from the low talented ones. However separating that means signalling effort for the highly talented becomes even more important in a two-dimensional signalling case. This attracts notice to time constraints. Under weak conditions separating equilibria do not exist if time constraints are binding. The existing equilibria are more costly but without additional information compared to the onedimensional case. Considering this, the efficiency of the current two-dimensional academic job market signalling can be improved by switching to a one-dimensional one.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Diskussionspapier ; No. 95

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Higher Education; Research Institutions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Labor Contracts
• Subject: Multi-dimensional signalling ; Academic job market ; Teaching and Research ; Akademische Berufe ; Arbeitsuche ; Hochschullehrer ; Wissenschaftler ; Signalling ; Gleichgewicht ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schneider, Andrea
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Helmut-Schmidt-Universität - Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Fächergruppe Volkswirtschaftslehre
• (where): Hamburg
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38722
• URN: urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-20873