Arbeitspapier

Fisheries Management with Multiple Market Failures

Within fisheries it is well-known that several market failures exist. However, fisheries economists analyse these market failures separately despite the fact that the market failures arise simultaneously. In this paper several market fail-ures that arise simultaneously are analysed. A resource stock tax and a tax on self-reported harvest are considered as a solution to problems associated with the stock externality, measuring individual catches and stock uncertainty. Within a fisheries economic model it is shown that it will be in the interest of risk-averse fishermen to report a part of their catch even without a control pol-icy. In addition, it is shown that this tax structure can secure optimal expected individual catches and simulations show that the tax payment is very low. Thus, the tax system may be useful in practical fisheries management.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IME Working Paper ; No. 54

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Fishery; Aquaculture
Economics of Regulation
Thema
Prices regulation
Quantity regulation
Asymmetric Information
Self-Reporting
Stock Tax and Harvest Tax
Fischwirtschaft
Fischerei
Unvollkommene Information
Dänemark

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jensen, Frank
Vestergaard, Niels
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics (IME)
(wo)
Esbjerg
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jensen, Frank
  • Vestergaard, Niels
  • University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics (IME)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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