Arbeitspapier

Limits to climate change

The paper proves the existence and uniqueness of a noncooperative steady state in the context of a model of climate change. It also explores the possibility of cooperation and attainment of an optimal steady state. It is shown that the problem is similar to that in the static model (Chander and Tulkens (1997)).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 42.2001

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Taxation and Subsidies: Incidence
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Subject
Climate change
dynamic models
steady states
optimality
cooperation
Klimawandel
Klimaschutz
Internationale Umweltpolitik
Dynamisches Spiel
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Chander, Parkash
Tulkens, Henry
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Chander, Parkash
  • Tulkens, Henry
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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