Arbeitspapier

Are banks less likely to issue equity when they are less capitalized?

Debt overhang and moral hazard related to risk-shifting opportunities predict that low capitalized banks have a lower likelihood to issue equity. In contrast to this view, for an international sample of bank Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs), we show that the likelihood of issuing an SEO is generally higher in low capitalized banks. We provide a series of tests exploring the variation of capital regulation, systemic conditions and market discipline to understand the driving forces behind this result. We find that market mechanisms rather than capital regulation are the primary, key driver of the decision to issue by low capitalized banks.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 100

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Subject
SEOs
Banking Regulation
Banking Crises
Counter-cyclical capital regulation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dinger, Valeriya
Vallascas, Francesco
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Osnabrück University, Institute of Empirical Economic Research
(where)
Osnabrück
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dinger, Valeriya
  • Vallascas, Francesco
  • Osnabrück University, Institute of Empirical Economic Research

Time of origin

  • 2014

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