Arbeitspapier

Language games under Knightian uncertainty about types

We concern a sender-receiver game of common interests having infinite types, e.g the set [0; 1]², but with finite signals. In our paper, we extend the game by introducing multiple priors over the type space and use incomplete preferences in Bewley's way. We characterize the equilibria under incomplete preferences by E-admissibility. Besides, it has the equivalence between the equilibria and Voronoi languages. Further, we demonstrates the existence of the indeterminacy of the game. At last, we present that vague words, e.g. cheap, big, red, etc., exist in the Knightian worlds but not in the Bayesian worlds, which means that vagueness comes from the way we view the world in Knightian method.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 656

Subject
Sprache
Spieltheorie
Philosophie
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Xing, Zhaojun
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
(where)
Bielefeld
(when)
2021

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29588491
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Xing, Zhaojun
  • Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)

Time of origin

  • 2021

Other Objects (12)