Arbeitspapier

The economics of capital allocation in firms: Evidence from internal capital markets

We analyze a unique survey dataset to examine the (micro)foundations of capital allocation in firms. Firms employ systems of interconnected measures to counteract agency problems, including layers of approval, divisional budgets, reporting requirements, and compensation schemes. When making funding decisions, top management relies heavily on top-level, nonfinancial information. However, substantial parts of the capital budget do not require top management approval as firms trade off the benefits and costs of decentralization. Even firms with active internal capital markets tilt capital allocation toward relatively even distributions. Within-firm agency problems may result in divisions' restricted access to internal capital.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: KIT Working Paper Series in Economics ; No. 115

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hoang, Daniel
Gatzer, Sebastian
Ruckes, Martin E.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)
(wo)
Karlsruhe
(wann)
2018

DOI
doi:10.5445/IR/1000079886
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:swb:90-798861
Letzte Aktualisierung
20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hoang, Daniel
  • Gatzer, Sebastian
  • Ruckes, Martin E.
  • Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON)

Entstanden

  • 2018

Ähnliche Objekte (12)