Arbeitspapier

The paradox of new members in the EU Council of Ministers: a non-cooperative bargaining analysis

Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may increase the power of an existing member, even if the number of votes of all existing members and the decision rule remain constant. This phenomenon is known as the paradox of new members. This paper uses the leading model of majoritarian bargaining and shows that the paradox is predicted in equilibrium for past EU enlargements. Furthermore, a majority of members would have been in favor of the 1981 enlargement even if members were bargaining over a fixed budget.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,123

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Thema
Majoritarian Bargaining
Weighted Voting
Power Measures
EU Enlargement
Paradox of New Members

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Montero, Maria
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Montero, Maria
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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