Bid-Ask Spreads with Indirect Competition Among Specialists

Arbeitspapier

Research Joint Ventures and subsidies are important R&D policy instruments. The regulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant information to regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there are appropriability problems is one such variable that is private information to the firms within the industry. In a duopoly setting we analyze the characteristics of a first-best and second-best R&D policy where the government can either allow Research Joint Ventures or not and give lump-sum subisides to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy improves upon the policy of an unsophisicated government by integrating reports of the firms on their spillovers and the correlation between the R&D spillovers of the firms into its formulation.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1107

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Gehrig, Thomas ; Jackson, Matthew
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 1994

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221463
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET