Arbeitspapier

Evasion and Time Consistency in the Taxation of Capital Income

Evasion and time inconsistency have been prominent concerns in recent discussions capital income taxation, both theoretical and applied. This paper establishes a link between them, suggesting a potentially useful role for evasion additional to those previously identified: by committing to relatively tax enforcement, the government may be able to alleviate the welfare loss implied by its inability to commit to the tax rate. The scope for this role proves strikingly wide: it is optimal for the government to facilitate the evasion of the capital income taxes that it chooses to impose whenever the time consistent tax rate exceeds that which would be optimal if the government could commit to it.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 890

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: General

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boadway, Robin W.
Keen, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
1993

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boadway, Robin W.
  • Keen, Michael
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1993

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