Arbeitspapier
Who's Who in Crime Network. Wanted the Key Player
Criminals are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among criminals are modeled by means of a graph where criminals compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbours. Each criminal decides in a non-cooperative way how much crime effort he will exert. We show that the Nash equilibrium crime effort of each individual is proportional to his equilibrium Bonacich-centrality in the network, thus establishing a bridge to the sociology literature on social networks. We then analyze a policy that consists of finding and getting rid of the key player, that is, the criminal who, once removed, leads to the maximum reduction in aggregate crime. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an optimal inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and his contribution to the centrality of the others. We also provide a geometric characterization of the key group, which generalizes the key player for a group of criminals of a given size. We finally endogeneize the crime participation decision, resulting in a key player policy, which effectiveness depends on the outside opportunities available to criminals.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 617
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Sociology of Economics
Noncooperative Games
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Thema
-
Social Networks
Crime
Centrality Measures
Key Group
Policies
Straftäter
Kriminalität
Theorie
Soziales Netzwerk
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ballester, Coralio
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
Zenou, Yves
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ballester, Coralio
- Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
- Zenou, Yves
- The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Entstanden
- 2004