Arbeitspapier

Who's Who in Crime Network. Wanted the Key Player

Criminals are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among criminals are modeled by means of a graph where criminals compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbours. Each criminal decides in a non-cooperative way how much crime effort he will exert. We show that the Nash equilibrium crime effort of each individual is proportional to his equilibrium Bonacich-centrality in the network, thus establishing a bridge to the sociology literature on social networks. We then analyze a policy that consists of finding and getting rid of the key player, that is, the criminal who, once removed, leads to the maximum reduction in aggregate crime. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an optimal inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and his contribution to the centrality of the others. We also provide a geometric characterization of the key group, which generalizes the key player for a group of criminals of a given size. We finally endogeneize the crime participation decision, resulting in a key player policy, which effectiveness depends on the outside opportunities available to criminals.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 617

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Sociology of Economics
Noncooperative Games
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
Social Networks
Crime
Centrality Measures
Key Group
Policies
Straftäter
Kriminalität
Theorie
Soziales Netzwerk
Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ballester, Coralio
Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
Zenou, Yves
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ballester, Coralio
  • Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
  • Zenou, Yves
  • The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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