Who's Who in Crime Network. Wanted the Key Player

Arbeitspapier

Criminals are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among criminals are modeled by means of a graph where criminals compete for a booty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbours. Each criminal decides in a non-cooperative way how much crime effort he will exert. We show that the Nash equilibrium crime effort of each individual is proportional to his equilibrium Bonacich-centrality in the network, thus establishing a bridge to the sociology literature on social networks. We then analyze a policy that consists of finding and getting rid of the key player, that is, the criminal who, once removed, leads to the maximum reduction in aggregate crime. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an optimal inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player's centrality and his contribution to the centrality of the others. We also provide a geometric characterization of the key group, which generalizes the key player for a group of criminals of a given size. We finally endogeneize the crime participation decision, resulting in a key player policy, which effectiveness depends on the outside opportunities available to criminals.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 617

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Sociology of Economics ; Noncooperative Games ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Subject: Social Networks ; Crime ; Centrality Measures ; Key Group ; Policies ; Straftäter ; Kriminalität ; Theorie ; Soziales Netzwerk ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ballester, Coralio ; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni ; Zenou, Yves
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81298