Banks, shadow banking, and fragility

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies a banking model of maturity transformation in which regulatory arbitrage induces the coexistence of regulated commercial banks and unregulated shadow banks. We derive three main results: First, the relative size of the shadow banking sector determines the stability of the financial system. If the shadow banking sector is small relative to the capacity of secondary markets for shadow banks' assets, shadow banking is stable. In turn, if the sector grows too large, it becomes fragile: an additional equilibrium emerges that is characterized by a panic-based run in the shadow banking sector. Second, if regulated commercial banks themselves operate shadow banks, a larger shadow banking sector is sustainable. However, once the threat of a crisis reappears, a crisis in the shadow banking sector spreads to the commercial banking sector. Third, in the presence of regulatory arbitrage, a safety net for banks may fail to prevent a banking crisis. Moreover, the safety net may be tested and may eventually become costly for the regulator.

Object Details

• ISBN: 978-92-899-1134-4
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1726

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Pension Funds; Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
• Subject: bank runs ; financial crisis ; maturity transformation ; regulatory arbitrage ; shadow banking

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Luck, Stephan ; Schempp, Paul
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): European Central Bank (ECB)
• (where): Frankfurt a. M.
• (when): 2014

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/154159
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET