Arbeitspapier

Efficient lottery design

There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely-used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2015-203

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Thema
lottery
ex post efficiency
sd-efficiency
random serial dictatorship

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kesten, Onur
Kurino, Morimitsu
Nesterov, Alexander
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kesten, Onur
  • Kurino, Morimitsu
  • Nesterov, Alexander
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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