Arbeitspapier
Efficient lottery design
There has been a surge of interest in stochastic assignment mechanisms which proved to be theoretically compelling thanks to their prominent welfare properties. Contrary to stochastic mechanisms, however, lottery mechanisms are commonly used for indivisible good allocation in real-life. To help facilitate the design of practical lottery mechanisms, we provide new tools for obtaining stochastic improvements in lotteries. As applications, we propose lottery mechanisms that improve upon the widely-used random serial dictatorship mechanism and a lottery representation of its competitor, the probabilistic serial mechanism. The tools we provide here can be useful in developing welfare-enhanced new lottery mechanisms for practical applications such as school choice.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2015-203
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- Thema
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lottery
ex post efficiency
sd-efficiency
random serial dictatorship
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Kesten, Onur
Kurino, Morimitsu
Nesterov, Alexander
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wann)
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2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kesten, Onur
- Kurino, Morimitsu
- Nesterov, Alexander
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Entstanden
- 2015