Arbeitspapier

The political economy of financial crisis policy

Government intervention to stabilise financial systems in times of banking crises ultimately involves political decisions. This paper sheds light on how certain political variables influence policy choices during banking crises and hence have an impact on fiscal outlays. We employ cross-country econometric evidence from all crisis episodes in the period 1970-2011 to examine the impact political and party systems have on the fiscal cost of financial sector intervention. Governments in presidential systems are associated with lower fiscal costs of crisis management because they are less likely to use costly bank guarantees, thus reducing the exposure of the state to significant contingent and direct fiscal liabilities. Consistent with these findings we find further evidence that these governments are less likely to use bank recapitalisation and more likely to impose losses on depositors.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bruegel Working Paper ; No. 2015/06

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
O'Keeffe, Mícheál
Terzi, Alessio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bruegel
(wo)
Brussels
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • O'Keeffe, Mícheál
  • Terzi, Alessio
  • Bruegel

Entstanden

  • 2015

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