Agendas in legislative decision-making

Artikel

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on two formats, the so-called Euro-Latin and Anglo-American agendas. In the current paper, I introduce a broad class of agendas whose defining structural features, history-independence and persistence, are common in legislative settings. I then characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize the rules implemented by more specialized formats (called priority agendas and convex agendas) whose structure is closely related to the prevailing rules for order-of-voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between structure and outcomes for a wide range of legislative agendas.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 16 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 235-274 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Majority voting ; sophisticated voting ; agendas ; committees ; implementation

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Horan, Sean
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2021

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2618
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/253442
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET