Spontaneous Norms in Law and Economics: A Sketch Typology

Arbeitspapier

This article offers a concise typology of spontaneous norms - i.e., norms that are formed or sustained through decentralized collective behavior in a community. The typology combines three criteria for identifying spontaneous norms: (i) implicit formation of (customary) rules, as opposed to explicit formation; (ii) enforcement through decentralized sanctioning actions, as opposed to enforcement by a special social agent; (iii) private interpretation of compliance with rules, as opposed to the presence of a public interpreter of compliance. The paper also suggests how identified types can be modeled game-theoretically as repeated games. It is argued that structural differences between various types of spontaneous norms can be best understood as differences in the sequence of play in a stage game. Further, the typology is illustrated with examples from legal history and legal anthropology. Supposedly dissimilar systems of norms (e.g., customary international law and primitive law; norms of warfare and domestic social norms) are shown to exhibit structural resemblance.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ILE Working Paper Series ; No. 66

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economic Methodology ; Law and Economics: General ; Economic History: Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation: General, International, or Comparative ; Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
• Subject: spontaneous norms ; custom ; customary law ; social norms ; comparative legal history ; typology

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Zdybel, Karol B.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE)
• (where): Hamburg
• (when): 2023

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/267890
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET