Ramsey monetary policy and international relative prices

Arbeitspapier

We analyze welfare maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic two-country model with price stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing literature, we remain consistent to a public finance approach by an explicit consideration of all the distortions that are relevant to the Ramsey planner. This strategy entails two main advantages. First, it allows an accurate characterization of optimal policy in an economy that evolves around a steady-state which is not necessarily efficient. Second, it allows to describe a full range of alternative dynamic equilibria when price setters in both countries are completely forwardlooking and households’ preferences are not restricted. In this context, we study optimal policy both in the long-run and along a dynamic path, and we compare optimal commitment policy under Nash competition and under cooperation. By deriving a second order accurate solution to the policy functions, we also characterize the welfare gains from international policy cooperation.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 344

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Monetary Policy ; Open Economy Macroeconomics
• Thema: Cooperation ; imperfect competition ; Nash equilibrium ; optimal monetary policy ; Ramsey planner ; sticky prices

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Faia, Ester ; Monacelli, Tommaso
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): European Central Bank (ECB)
• (wo): Frankfurt a. M.
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/152778
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ