Arbeitspapier

Anxiety, overconfidence, and excessive risk taking

We provide a preference-based rationale for endogenous overconfidence. Horizon-dependent risk aversion, combined with a possibility to forget, can generate overconfidence and excessive risk taking in equilibrium. An "anxiety prone" agent, who is more risk-averse to imminent than to distant risks, has an incentive to distort her future self's beliefs toward underestimating risk. Such self-deception can be achieved even if the future self is aware of the attempted distortion. We relate our results to the literature on empirically observed overconfidence and excessive risk taking in several domains of financial and other types of decision making.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 711

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Expectations; Speculations
Thema
overconfidence
dynamic consistency
biases
deception
risk taking

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Eisenbach, Thomas M.
Schmalz, Martin C.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Eisenbach, Thomas M.
  • Schmalz, Martin C.
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2015

Ähnliche Objekte (12)