Arbeitspapier
On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-034/1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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Spatial voting models
electoral competition
winning set
interest groups.
Abstimmungsregel
Interessenvertretung
Räumliche Interaktion
Neue politische Ökonomie
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Wahlkampf
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Sadiraj, Vjollca
Tuinstra, Jan
van Winden, Frans
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Sadiraj, Vjollca
- Tuinstra, Jan
- van Winden, Frans
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2005