Arbeitspapier

On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 05-034/1

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
Spatial voting models
electoral competition
winning set
interest groups.
Abstimmungsregel
Interessenvertretung
Räumliche Interaktion
Neue politische Ökonomie
Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie
Wahlkampf

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Sadiraj, Vjollca
Tuinstra, Jan
van Winden, Frans
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Sadiraj, Vjollca
  • Tuinstra, Jan
  • van Winden, Frans
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2005

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