Residence-based Capital Taxation: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and why it is not

Arbeitspapier

The issue of capital tax competition in source-based capital taxes is viewed to be unproblematic if residence-based capital taxation exists. The sustainability, however, of residence-based capital taxation depends on the co-operation of source countries to assist in collecting tax revenues that benefit the residence country. We analyze conditions under which information about foreign savings are voluntarily exchanged. It turns out that information is voulntarily exchanged if the wage structure of the economy is not influenced by the size of the financial sector resulting in an efficient allocation with decentralized tax policies. In contrast, strategic incentives to withhold information may exist if the size of the financial sector has a positive impact on the wage structure of an economy.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 402

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Tax competition ; information exchange

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eggert, Wolfgang ; Kolmar, Martin
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2000

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/75818
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ