Artikel
Information disclosure through technology licensing
We show that even if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is still possible through technology licensing. However, unlike the case of a cost-free honest outside agency, where information transmission always occurs under a quantity setting oligopoly, information transmission through licensing does not always occur.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-8 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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asymmetric information
information transmission
licensing
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Mukherjee, Arijit
Bagchi, Aniruddha
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g11030037
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Mukherjee, Arijit
- Bagchi, Aniruddha
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2020