Artikel

Information disclosure through technology licensing

We show that even if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is still possible through technology licensing. However, unlike the case of a cost-free honest outside agency, where information transmission always occurs under a quantity setting oligopoly, information transmission through licensing does not always occur.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-8 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
asymmetric information
information transmission
licensing

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Mukherjee, Arijit
Bagchi, Aniruddha
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
MDPI
(where)
Basel
(when)
2020

DOI
doi:10.3390/g11030037
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Mukherjee, Arijit
  • Bagchi, Aniruddha
  • MDPI

Time of origin

  • 2020

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