Artikel
Information disclosure through technology licensing
We show that even if information transmission through an honest outside agency is not possible due to the possibility of collusion between the firms and the outside agency, information transmission is still possible through technology licensing. However, unlike the case of a cost-free honest outside agency, where information transmission always occurs under a quantity setting oligopoly, information transmission through licensing does not always occur.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 11 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 1-8 ; Basel: MDPI
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Thema
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asymmetric information
information transmission
licensing
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Mukherjee, Arijit
Bagchi, Aniruddha
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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MDPI
- (wo)
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Basel
- (wann)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g11030037
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Mukherjee, Arijit
- Bagchi, Aniruddha
- MDPI
Entstanden
- 2020