Arbeitspapier

Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy

The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. However, in a particular range, improving institutions may even decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2004-18

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
Credit markets
institutions
bank competition
information sharing
bankruptcy
relationship banking

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hainz, Christa
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2004

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.388
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-388-5
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hainz, Christa
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2004

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