Arbeitspapier
Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets and Bankruptcy
The number of firm bankruptcies is surprisingly low in economies with poor institutions. We study a model of bank-firm relationship and show that the bank's decision to liquidate bad firms has two opposing effects. First, the bank gets a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it loses the rent from incumbent customers due to its informational advantage. We show that institutions must improve significantly in order to yield a stable equilibrium in which the optimal number of firms is liquidated. However, in a particular range, improving institutions may even decrease the number of bad firms liquidated.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2004-18
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Basic Areas of Law: General (Constitutional Law)
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Credit markets
institutions
bank competition
information sharing
bankruptcy
relationship banking
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hainz, Christa
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2004
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.388
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-388-5
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hainz, Christa
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Entstanden
- 2004