Arbeitspapier
Financial Intermediation and Deposit Contracts: A Strategic View
This paper investigates competition among financial intermediaries in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) economy under no aggregate uncertainty. The economy is populated by self-interested financial intermediaries that compete strategically over deposit contracts offered to consumers. Both exclusive and nonexclusive competition perspective are considered, in both cases multiple equilibria arise if banks do not have an initial endowment. When financial intermediaries have a sufficient level of endowment, regardless the competition perspective adopted, the first best allocation is the unique equilibrium allocation.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 15/213
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- Thema
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financial intermediation
deposit contracts
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Larocca, Vittorio
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
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Zurich
- (wann)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010427309
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Larocca, Vittorio
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2015