Arbeitspapier

Financial Intermediation and Deposit Contracts: A Strategic View

This paper investigates competition among financial intermediaries in a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) economy under no aggregate uncertainty. The economy is populated by self-interested financial intermediaries that compete strategically over deposit contracts offered to consumers. Both exclusive and nonexclusive competition perspective are considered, in both cases multiple equilibria arise if banks do not have an initial endowment. When financial intermediaries have a sufficient level of endowment, regardless the competition perspective adopted, the first best allocation is the unique equilibrium allocation.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 15/213

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Thema
financial intermediation
deposit contracts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Larocca, Vittorio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010427309
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Larocca, Vittorio
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2015

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