Arbeitspapier

A fair day's pay for a fair day's work: Optimal tax design as redistributional arbitrage

We study optimal tax design based on the idea that policy-makers face trade-offs between multiple margins of redistribution. Within a Mirrleesian economy with earnings, consumption and retirement savings, we derive a novel formula for optimal income and savings distortions based on redistributional arbitrage. We establish a sufficient statistics representation of the labor income and capital tax rates on top income earners in dynamic environments, which relies on the observed distributions of both income and consumption. Because consumption has a thinner Pareto tail than income, our quantitative results suggest that it is optimal to shift a substantial fraction of the top earners' tax burden from income to savings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. WP 2022-03

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
capital taxation
income taxation
consumption inequality
Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency
Optimal Taxation
Optimale Besteuerung
Einkommensteuer
Sparen
Besteuerungsverfahren
Umverteilung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hellwig, Christian
Werquin, Nicolas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
(wo)
Chicago, IL
(wann)
2022

DOI
doi:10.21033/wp-2022-03
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hellwig, Christian
  • Werquin, Nicolas
  • Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago

Entstanden

  • 2022

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