Democracy and International Conflict

Arbeitspapier

During the past two centuries, western nations have successively extended the voting franchise to citizens of lower income. We explain this process of democratization as a rational way for incumbent elites to wage war effectively on other nations, as in a strategic game of international conflict handing over military spending decisions to citizens who face a lower tax cost of arming may confer a strategic delegation advantage. We find supporting empirical evidence in case studies of franchise extensions in the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5856

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions ; International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions ; Economic Development: Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
• Subject: war ; conflict ; contest ; democracy ; franchise extension

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Vesperoni, Alberto ; Wärneryd, Karl
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/141833
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET