Arbeitspapier
A general equilibrium model of sovereign borrowing and non-sovereign financial intermediation
In a general equilibrium model, international lending through a non-sovereign financial intermediary (a banking system) to a sovereign borrower is analyzed. Under very pessimistic assumptions, including a principal-agency type of incentive to load future intermediation with certain bancrupcy for the sake of present sovereign debt servicing, sustainable international lending that avoids both, repudiation and bancrupcy is determined. There is a plethora of roll-over and net-transfer steady-states. Compared to financial autarky, steady-state lending is capital depriving. Nevertheless, lending may be welfare improving in the creditor country and the world as a whole.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 40
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Internationale Staatsschulden
Allgemeines Gleichgewicht
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Mohr, Ernst
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Konstanz
- (when)
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1987
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mohr, Ernst
- Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 1987
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