Arbeitspapier

Optimal supervisory architecture and financial integration in a banking union

Both in the United States and in the Euro area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central/federal supervisors. I study how such a system can optimally balance the lower inspection costs of local supervisors with the ability of the central level to internalize cross-border or interstate externalities. The model predicts that centralised supervision endogenously increases market integration and cross-border externalities, further strengthening the need for centralised supervision. This complementarity implies that, for some parameterizations of the model, the economy can be trapped in a local supervision equilibrium with low supervision and integration. In such a case, the forward-looking introduction of a centralized supervisory architecture achieves a superior equilibrium.

ISBN
978-92-899-1599-1
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1786

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Economics of Regulation
Thema
bank supervision
banking union
Financial integration
regulatory federalism
single supervisory mechanism

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Colliard, Jean-Edouard
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Colliard, Jean-Edouard
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2015

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