Arbeitspapier
Optimal supervisory architecture and financial integration in a banking union
Both in the United States and in the Euro area, bank supervision is the joint responsibility of local and central/federal supervisors. I study how such a system can optimally balance the lower inspection costs of local supervisors with the ability of the central level to internalize cross-border or interstate externalities. The model predicts that centralised supervision endogenously increases market integration and cross-border externalities, further strengthening the need for centralised supervision. This complementarity implies that, for some parameterizations of the model, the economy can be trapped in a local supervision equilibrium with low supervision and integration. In such a case, the forward-looking introduction of a centralized supervisory architecture achieves a superior equilibrium.
- ISBN
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978-92-899-1599-1
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 1786
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium: Financial Markets
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Economics of Regulation
- Thema
-
bank supervision
banking union
Financial integration
regulatory federalism
single supervisory mechanism
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Colliard, Jean-Edouard
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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European Central Bank (ECB)
- (wo)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (wann)
-
2015
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Colliard, Jean-Edouard
- European Central Bank (ECB)
Entstanden
- 2015