Arbeitspapier

Regime type, inequality, and redistributive transfers in developing countries

The debate on whether democracy and inequality increase the level of redistribution is ongoing. We construct a model that predicts higher probability of redistribution in democracies than autocracies through social transfers. Higher inequality leads to more redistribution in democracies but not necessarily in autocracies. Using the new data on Non-Contributory Social Transfer Programmes for 1990-2015, we find democracies are more likely to have a transfer programme. This is consistent with previous conclusions that democracy enhances redistribution measured by tax revenues and government expenditures. We also present less robust evidence that countries with a transfer programme experience higher inequality.

ISBN
978-92-9256-254-0
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WIDER Working Paper ; No. 2017/30

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
National Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
Thema
regime type
redistribution
inequality
social transfers
median voter theorem

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Dodlova, Marina
Giolbas, Anna
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2017

DOI
doi:10.35188/UNU-WIDER/2017/254-0
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Dodlova, Marina
  • Giolbas, Anna
  • The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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