Externalities, communication and the allocation of decision rights

Arbeitspapier

This paper views authority as the right to undertake decisions that impose externalities on other members of the organization. When only decision rights can be contractually assigned to one of the organization's stakeholders, the optimal assignment minimizes the resulting inefficiencies by giving control rights to the party with the highest stake in the organization's decisions. Under asymmetric information, the efficient allocation of authority depends on the communication of private information. In the case of multiple decision areas, divided control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist complementarities between different decisions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 3938369205
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 2005/21

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Firm Organization and Market Structure ; Capitalist Systems: Property Rights
• Thema: Authority ; Decision Rights ; Externalities ; Incomplete Contracts ; Imperfect Information ; Theory of the Firm ; Theorie der Unternehmung ; Unvollständiger Vertrag ; Unvollkommene Information ; Externer Effekt ; Agency Theory ; Entscheidung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bester, Helmut
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Freie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2005

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/28019
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ