Arbeitspapier

Distributed Ledgers and the Governance of Money

Blockchain technology breathes new life into the classical analysis of money as a substitute for a ledger of all past transactions. While it involves updating the ledger through a decentralized consensus on the unique truth, the robustness of the equilibrium that supports this consensus depends on who has access to the ledger and how it can be updated. To find the optimal solution, Buterin’s “scalability trilemma” needs to be addressed, so that a workable balance can be found between decentralization, security (i.e. a robust consensus), and scale (the efficient volume of transactions). Using a global game analysis of an exchange economy with credit, we solve for the optimal ledger design that balances the three objectives of this trilemma. We characterize the optimal number of validators, supermajority threshold, fees and transaction size. When intertemporal incentives are strong, a centralized ledger is always optimal. Otherwise, decentralization may be optimal, and validators need to be selected from the set of users of the system.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9441

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General
Monetary Systems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System; Payment Systems
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Thema
market design
money distributed ledger technology
DLT
blockchain
decentralized finance
global game
consensus

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Auer, Raphael A.
Monnet, Cyril
Shin, Hyun Song
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Auer, Raphael A.
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • Shin, Hyun Song
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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