Long-run selection and the work ethic

Arbeitspapier

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Objekt anzeigen

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1319

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification ; Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility ; Public Goods ; Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: work ethic ; evolution ; group selection ; public goods ; stochastic dynamics ; Arbeitsethik ; Motivation ; Evolutionsökonomik ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Josephson, Jens ; Waerneryd, Karl
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18684