Arbeitspapier

Monetary Policy and Financial Stability in the Long Run

Most theoretical central bank models use short horizons and focus on a single tradeoff. However, in reality, central banks play complex, long-horizon games and face more than one tradeoff. We account for these issues in a simple infinite-horizon game with a novel tradeoff: higher rates deter financial imbalances, but lower rates reduce the likelihood of insolvency. We term these factors discipline and stability effects, respectively. The central bank's welfare decreases with dependence between real and financial shocks, so it may reduce costs with correlation-indexed securities. In our model, independent central banks cannot in general attain both low inflation and financial stability.

ISBN
978-82-7553-774-2
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2013/21

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
central bank
correlation-indexed security
discipline effect
stability effect

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cao, Jin
Chollete, Lorán
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Norges Bank
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Cao, Jin
  • Chollete, Lorán
  • Norges Bank

Entstanden

  • 2013

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