Arbeitspapier

Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3014

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Thema
spatial voting models
electoral competition
winning set
interest groups
Wahlkampf
Wahlverhalten
Interessenvertretung
Public Choice
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Sadiraj, Vjollca
Tuinstra, Jan
van Winden, Frans
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Sadiraj, Vjollca
  • Tuinstra, Jan
  • van Winden, Frans
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2010

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