Arbeitspapier

Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3014

Classification
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Subject
spatial voting models
electoral competition
winning set
interest groups
Wahlkampf
Wahlverhalten
Interessenvertretung
Public Choice
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Sadiraj, Vjollca
Tuinstra, Jan
van Winden, Frans
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2010

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Sadiraj, Vjollca
  • Tuinstra, Jan
  • van Winden, Frans
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2010

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