Arbeitspapier
Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger
Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3014
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- Subject
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spatial voting models
electoral competition
winning set
interest groups
Wahlkampf
Wahlverhalten
Interessenvertretung
Public Choice
Theorie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Sadiraj, Vjollca
Tuinstra, Jan
van Winden, Frans
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2010
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Sadiraj, Vjollca
- Tuinstra, Jan
- van Winden, Frans
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2010