Arbeitspapier

Unemployment duration, incentives and institutions: A micro-econometric analysis based on Scandinavian data

Based on a combined register database for Norwegian and Swedish unemployment spells, we use the ‘between-countries-variation’ in the unemployment insurance systems to identify causal effects. The elasticity of the job hazard rate with respect to the benefit replacement ratio is around -1.0 in Norway and -0.5 in Sweden. The limited benefit duration period in Sweden has a large positive impact on the hazard rate, despite generous renewal options through participation in labour market programs. Compulsory program participation seems to operate as a ‘stick’, rather than a ‘carrot’, and is therefore an efficienttool for counteracting moral hazard problems in the benefit system.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2002,09

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Thema
Unemployment spells
unemployment compensation
non-parametric duration analysis
Arbeitslosigkeit
Dauer
Arbeitslosenversicherung
Konjunktur
Norwegen

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Røed, Knut
Jensen, Peter
Thoursie, Anna
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
(wo)
Oslo
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Røed, Knut
  • Jensen, Peter
  • Thoursie, Anna
  • University of Oslo, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2002

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