Unemployment duration, incentives and institutions: A micro-econometric analysis based on Scandinavian data

Arbeitspapier

Based on a combined register database for Norwegian and Swedish unemployment spells, we use the ‘between-countries-variation’ in the unemployment insurance systems to identify causal effects. The elasticity of the job hazard rate with respect to the benefit replacement ratio is around -1.0 in Norway and -0.5 in Sweden. The limited benefit duration period in Sweden has a large positive impact on the hazard rate, despite generous renewal options through participation in labour market programs. Compulsory program participation seems to operate as a ‘stick’, rather than a ‘carrot’, and is therefore an efficienttool for counteracting moral hazard problems in the benefit system.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Memorandum ; No. 2002,09

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies ; Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
• Subject: Unemployment spells ; unemployment compensation ; non-parametric duration analysis ; Arbeitslosigkeit ; Dauer ; Arbeitslosenversicherung ; Konjunktur ; Norwegen

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Røed, Knut ; Jensen, Peter ; Thoursie, Anna
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Oslo, Department of Economics
• (where): Oslo
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/63029
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET