Arbeitspapier

Choosing whether to compete: Price and format competition with consumer confusion

We run a market experiment where firms can choose not only their price but also whether to present comparable offers. They are faced with artificial demand from consumers who make mistakes when assessing the net value of products on the market. If some offers are comparable however, some consumers favor the best of the comparable offers vs. non-comparable offers. We vary the number of such consumers as well as the strength of their preferences for the best of the comparable offers. In treatments where firms observe the past decisions of their competitors, firms learn not to present comparable offers especially when many consumers prefer comparable offers. This occurs after initial periods with strong competition and leads to lower welfare for all consumers. In treatments where firms cannot monitor the competition, firms end up having to present comparable offers, which leads to an improvement in welfare for all consumers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2014-026

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Consumer Protection
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Subject
asymmetric dominance
attraction effect
collusion
competition
confusopoly
experiment
framing
industrial organization
obfuscation
oligopoly
price comparison
shrouding
spurious complexity
standardization
transparency

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Crosetto, Paolo
Gaudeul, Alexia
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(where)
Jena
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Crosetto, Paolo
  • Gaudeul, Alexia
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2014

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