Towards a European constitution: fiscal federalism and the allocation of economic competences

Arbeitspapier

The paper analyzes one important aspect of the constitutional debate: the allocation of econornie competences between the EU and the mernber states. It takes the theory of fiscal federalism as a starting point for an optimal allocation of economic competences. The main message of the theory is that a transfer of econornie competences from a lower to a higher political level always leads to a negligence of individual preferences and, therefore, can only be economically justified if national policies cause strong spillovers (externalities) to other jurisdictions. Based on this approach, the paper proposes an allocation of econornic conipetences that can serve as an overall. guideline for a European constitution.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1125

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession ; International Policy Coordination and Transmission ; Economic Integration ; Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
• Subject: fiscal federalism ; allocation of competences ; European constitution ; Wirtschaftspolitik ; Policy-Mix ; Finanzföderalismus ; Spillover-Effekt ; Föderalismus ; Internalisierung externer Effekte ; Verfassungsreform ; Verfassungsökonomik ; EU-Staaten

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Stehn, Jürgen
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel Institute for World Economics (IfW)
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2820