The Limits to Moral Erosion in Markets: Social Norms and the Replacement Excuse

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the impact of a key feature of competitive markets on moral behavior: the possibility that a competitor will step in and conclude the deal if a conscientious market actor forgoes a profitable business opportunity for ethical reasons. We study experimentally whether people employ the argument “if I don’t do it, someone else will” to justify taking a narrowly self-interested action. Our data reveal a clear pattern. Subjects do not employ the “replacement excuse” if a social norm exists that classifies the selfish action as immoral. But if no social norm exists, subjects are more inclined to take a selfish action in situations where another subject can otherwise take it. By demonstrating the importance of social norms of moral behavior for limiting the power of the replacement excuse, our paper informs the long-standing debate on the effect of markets on morals.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6696

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
• Subject: replacement excuse ; social norms ; moral behavior ; competition ; markets ; utilitarianism ; deontological ethics

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bartling, Björn ; Özdemir, Yagiz
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/172972
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET