Arbeitspapier

Demand growth, entry and collusion sustainability

The purpose of this paper is to represent in which way a stable and no negligible growth in demand can affect the level of sustainability of collusion. For the European Commission this assumption is seen as a factor that disincentives collusion and pushes to a competitive behavior. This fact maybe is not so obvious and I have shown that what is important is the final effect on entry in the market. In fact, expected oligopolistic profits are as the Faith Morgana that attracts competitors and disappears when they have come in. Entry is profitable if it is finite, i.e. one or very few entrants, and if prices above marginal cost are still successfully sustainable.Our result is that demand growth path is not a sufficient condition to neglect the risk of collective dominance, and in order to support our analysis we consider first some trigger strategy equilibria where deviation punishment is implemented by Nash Reversion for ever. After that, we consider Abreu's simple penal code (1986) and we have derived a non stationary optimal penal code that in our structural changing framework implement collusion before and after entry as a subgames perfect equilibrium. The final conclusion is that demand growth, ceteris paribus, is negative correlated with the critical discount factor necessary to substaines collusion.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 62.2002

Classification
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Subject
penal code
merger control
demand growth
Kartell
Markteintritt
Fusionskontrolle
Gesamtwirtschaftliche Nachfrage
Theorie
EU-Staaten

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Capuano, Carlo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(where)
Milano
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Capuano, Carlo
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Time of origin

  • 2002

Other Objects (12)