Doping in Contest-Like Situations

Arbeitspapier

Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major e.ects are identified which determine a player’s doping decision — a cost e.ect, a likelihood e.ect and a windfall-profit e.ect. Moreover, we discuss whether the favorite or the underdog is more likely to be doped, the impact of doping on overall performance, the influence of increased heterogeneity on doping, the welfare implications of doping, and possible prevention of doping.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 14/2005

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Subject: contest ; doping ; drugs ; fraud in research ; tournament

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kräkel, Matthias
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22920