Arbeitspapier

Peer Effects and Incentives

In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents' incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents' efforts are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. I solve for the optimal monetary incentives that complement the peer effects and show that the principal prefers sequential effort choices of the agents to choosing efforts simultaneously.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 03/2014

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Economics of Contract: Theory
Thema
externalities
moral hazard
other-regarding preferences

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kräkel, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kräkel, Matthias
  • University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)

Entstanden

  • 2014

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