Arbeitspapier
Peer Effects and Incentives
In a multi-agent setting, individuals often compare own performance with that of their peers. These comparisons influence agents' incentives and lead to a noncooperative game, even if the agents have to complete independent tasks. I show that depending on the interplay of the peer effects, agents' efforts are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. I solve for the optimal monetary incentives that complement the peer effects and show that the principal prefers sequential effort choices of the agents to choosing efforts simultaneously.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 03/2014
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
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externalities
moral hazard
other-regarding preferences
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kräkel, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kräkel, Matthias
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2014