Arbeitspapier

Bank screening heterogeneity

Production efficiency and financial stability do not necessarily go hand in hand. With heterogeneity in banks' abilities to screen borrowers, the market for loans becomes segmented and a self-competition mechanism arises. When heterogeneity increases, the intensive and extensive margins have opposite effects. Bank informational rents unambiguously decrease welfare and distort effort incentives. But the bank most efficient at screening expands its market share by competing against itself to offer effort-inducing contracts, which decreases the share of non-performing loans. A macroprudential authority acting alone reinforces this tension. Optimality is restored by targeting lending policies toward borrowers with intermediate abilities.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper ; No. 2016-56

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Financial institutions
Financial stability
Financial system regulation and policies

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Duprey, Thibaut
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2016

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2016-56
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Duprey, Thibaut
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2016

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