Constraints on Matching Markets Based on Moral Concerns

Konferenzbeitrag

Many markets ban monetary transfers. Rather than exogenously imposing this constraint, we introduce discrimination-freeness as a desideratum based on egalitarian objectives. Discrimination-freeness requires that an agent's object assignment is independent of his wealth. We show that money cannot be used to Pareto-improve ordinal and money-free assignments without violating discrimination-freeness. Furthermore, if a discrimination-free assignment of objects and money is implementable then the respective object assignment is also implementable without money. Once money can be used outside a market designer's control, further restrictions than only money-freeness might be required to address discrimination concerns.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2020: Gender Economics

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Design ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Publicly Provided Private Goods ; Health, Education, and Welfare: General
• Thema: repugnance ; inequality ; market design ; matching markets

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Huesmann, Katharina ; Wambach, Achim
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
• (wo): Kiel, Hamburg
• (wann): 2020

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/224636
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ